Abstract: SetupClaw Basic Setup secures OpenClaw by tightening access control, reducing internet exposure, constraining execution paths, and forcing review where risk is highest. It improves security and reliability in measurable ways, but it does not remove model error, social engineering risk, or the need for operational discipline. This deep-dive maps practical controls to clear guarantees and non-guarantees so teams know what is actually protected on day one.
Most security conversations about AI agents fail because they start with the wrong question. People ask, “Is it secure?” as if the answer is binary. But when OpenClaw is running on a Hetzner VPS and reachable through Telegram, the real question is narrower and more useful: who can trigger it, what can it execute, and how do you stop silent high-impact actions.
That framing is exactly why SetupClaw Basic Setup is built around boundaries instead of slogans. The system can be significantly safer than a default install, and still not be “perfectly secure”. Those two things are both true at the same time. If you keep that in view, decisions become much clearer.
The practical threat model for Basic Setup
A SetupClaw deployment is easiest to reason about when you split risk into four boundaries.
The first boundary is identity. If untrusted users can trigger the bot, model quality will not save you. The second boundary is execution. If the agent has broad tools, broad browser sessions, and broad write access, one bad instruction can create broad damage. The third boundary is host trust. OpenClaw state lives on the VPS, so host access controls are not optional. The fourth boundary is approval workflow. If changes can merge or deploy directly, mistakes turn into incidents quickly.
This is why Basic Setup focuses on identity controls, minimal network surface, constrained execution, and review gates that are hard to bypass accidentally.
SetupClaw configures controls; customers retain responsibility for account security, key/token hygiene, and approval discipline.
What the hardening does protect
At the identity layer, SetupClaw uses Telegram policies such as allowlisted users/chats, explicit DM policy, and require-mention in groups. These controls reduce accidental triggers from noisy group traffic and block unknown senders from becoming operators.
At the platform layer, in Basic Setup, the gateway is configured to remain private by default unless intentionally exposed with additional controls. The point is to reduce reachable attack surface, not to publish every management interface and hope authentication catches everything.
At the workflow layer, PR-only patterns are used as a compensating control for repository changes. The agent can propose work, run checks, and open PRs, but protected branches and review checks prevent silent direct merges.
At the operations layer, the handoff includes verification steps and runbook boundaries. Security controls are only useful if someone can test and re-test them after setup.
What the hardening does not protect
This is where many providers become vague. It is better to be explicit.
Basic Setup does not guarantee zero prompt injection risk. It does not guarantee zero model mistakes. It does not guarantee zero leakage if a user enables broad browser automation with live authenticated sessions. It does not guarantee cron execution while gateway or host is offline. And it does not guarantee that data never leaves third-party infrastructure when messaging channels or remote APIs are used.
None of this means the setup is weak. It means the guarantees are honest and operationally grounded.
Browser, memory, and cron boundaries in plain terms
Browser automation should be treated as account access. If the browser profile is logged into a sensitive system, the bot’s actions in that profile carry that authority. Isolated profiles reduce blast radius, but they do not make unsafe prompts harmless.
Memory improves consistency, but memory is also durable state. If users tell the agent to store sensitive material, it may be retained in local files and indexes. Structure helps, policy helps, and review helps, but no memory system can prevent every bad instruction automatically.
Cron improves reliability for recurring work, but it is not an uptime-independent delivery service. If the gateway is down, jobs do not execute. Reliability therefore includes service health checks, restart behaviour, and recovery procedures, not just cron definitions.
Practical implementation steps
Step one: lock identity before tuning behaviour
Define Telegram allowlists first. Set DM policy deliberately. Enable require-mention in groups. Then test from an allowed chat and a non-allowed chat so the boundary is proven, not assumed.
Step two: keep management surfaces private by default
Restrict inbound exposure to the minimum required for operations. Keep gateway access private unless a specific use case requires controlled remote exposure. Document where OpenClaw state is stored and who can access it on the host.
Step three: constrain high-impact execution paths
For repo-changing workflows, use PR-only patterns with protected branches and required checks. For side-effectful tools, use narrower permissions and approval points where possible. Scope credentials to least privilege so compromise has a smaller blast radius.
Step four: make reliability testable
Run regular health checks and diagnostics (available checks can vary by version; verify in your installed OpenClaw docs/CLI). Verify cron behaviour after restart scenarios. Keep a short incident and recovery runbook so operators know what to do when a control fails.
If gateway downtime causes missed cron executions, runbook steps should include manual catch-up and post-recovery verification.
Step five: hand off a boundary table, not just a config file
The most useful handoff artefact is a table with five columns: Control, Protects Against, Does Not Protect Against, Owner, and Verification Command. That converts security claims into repeatable operations and shared accountability.
A sample verification rhythm for day two
A weekly check is usually enough for small deployments. Confirm Telegram gating still behaves as expected. Confirm PR-only protections are still enabled on the target repositories. Confirm gateway health and audit tooling still run cleanly. Confirm recovery instructions still match reality after any infrastructure changes.
This takes less time than people think, and it prevents the slow drift where a secure baseline degrades into a risky one without anyone noticing.