Abstract: In a SetupClaw deployment, Telegram is not just a chat channel, it is your day-to-day control plane. That means Telegram policy is infrastructure security. This guide explains how to set least-privilege defaults for OpenClaw bots using allowlists, mention-gating, DM policy, and token hygiene, then ties those controls to cron delivery governance, memory quality, and PR-only change safety.
People often treat Telegram settings as convenience options. In practice, they are trust boundaries. If OpenClaw is running on a Hetzner VPS and Telegram is your remote interface, channel policy decides who can steer automation and under what conditions.
That is why SetupClaw Basic Setup treats Telegram hardening as core platform work. It is not a cosmetic layer on top of a secure server. It is one of the primary controls that determines whether the server remains secure in daily use.
Start with least privilege, not broad access
The safest opening move is simple. Only allow known senders and keep direct-message access constrained until trust is explicit.
In SetupClaw’s recommended baseline, DM policy starts constrained (pairing/allowlist-style) and is widened only for documented operational reasons. It is tempting to open DMs and “watch it manually”, but that shifts risk to constant human vigilance and creates a larger social-engineering surface.
Least privilege scales better than manual monitoring because it reduces noise before it reaches the assistant.
Allowlists reduce unauthorized triggers but do not protect against a compromised trusted Telegram account.
Group chats and direct messages should not share the same policy
A common mistake is applying identical rules to DMs and group chats. They have different trust characteristics.
DMs are usually operator context with a small, known audience. Groups are collaborative spaces with more ambiguity, more message volume, and more chance of accidental trigger or hostile prompt content.
So policy should reflect that difference. Keep DMs narrowly controlled and treat groups as lower-trust by default, with explicit gating and isolation rules.
Mention-gating is the highest-value group default
If you only apply one group control, make it mention-gating.
With requireMention: true, the bot responds only when explicitly called. This reduces accidental task execution from ambient conversation and lowers the chance that random group content steers automation.
People sometimes push back because mentions feel slightly slower. In practice, the trade-off is worth it. A little friction at trigger time prevents a lot of ambiguity during incident response.
BotFather privacy mode changes should be deliberate
Telegram bot visibility in groups is another area where teams over-open too early. Disabling privacy mode or granting broad admin visibility can be legitimate, but only when the use case really needs full-message access.
If you do not need full visibility, do not grant it. The right default is minimal message scope, then deliberate expansion tied to a specific workflow requirement.
This keeps the security story coherent. You cannot claim least privilege while giving broad read scope “just in case”.
Token hygiene is not optional
The Telegram bot token is a credential. Treat it like a password with production impact.
That means storing it server-side, never embedding it in ad hoc scripts, rotating it quickly if exposure is suspected, and documenting rotation steps before an incident. Teams often say, “we will notice if it leaks”. Usually they notice late, after misuse.
Token handling should be part of the runbook, not tribal knowledge.
Keep gateway access private while fixing Telegram issues
When Telegram policy goes wrong, operators sometimes widen gateway exposure for convenience. That usually creates a second problem while fixing the first.
A safer pattern is to keep the gateway control plane private-first, loopback, Tailscale, or SSH access patterns, and use those paths for remediation. Channel mistakes should not trigger emergency network broadening.
This discipline matters because security incidents often happen in moments of hurry.
Why this improves memory and automation quality
Channel hardening is not only about blocking misuse. It improves operational quality.
Stronger sender and mention controls reduce low-trust content entering long-lived memory and incident notes. That improves retrieval quality later because your memory store has less junk and fewer ambiguous commands.
Channel hardening also improves cron delivery governance (correct chat scopes and recipients), while scheduler uptime remains a separate service reliability concern.
And none of this replaces PR-only process for code changes. Telegram policy controls who can request actions. PR-only controls how risky changes are reviewed and shipped. You want both.
Practical implementation steps
Step one: define allowed identities and chats
Create an explicit allowlist for approved senders and approved chat contexts. Review it with the operator before enabling production interactions.
Step two: set DM policy to pairing or allowlist mode
Keep DMs constrained by default. Expand only for documented use cases, not convenience.
Step three: enable mention-gating in groups
Set group policy so the bot only responds when directly mentioned. Test both mention and non-mention messages.
Step four: review BotFather privacy/admin settings
Grant only the message visibility needed for the intended workflow. Avoid broad group visibility unless required.
Step five: verify token storage and rotation path
Confirm token location is server-side, restricted by permissions, and backed by a written rotation procedure.
Step six: run a short validation test sequence
Use a compact matrix and record expected outcomes:
- allowed DM
- non-allowed DM
- allowed group with mention
- allowed group without mention
- non-allowed group with mention
What should appear in handoff documentation
A strong Basic Setup handoff for Telegram security is compact and explicit: who is allowed, which groups are enabled, mention policy, DM policy, token location, rotation steps, and the exact test sequence used to validate controls.
This is the difference between “secure right now” and “operable after handover.” It gives the customer a system they can maintain without reopening trust boundaries by accident.